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SUMMARY
This paper describes types, processes and importance of rent-seeking in the allocation of timber rights in Ghana. It is based on an analysis of 
30 interviews with large-, medium- and small-scale timber firms, as well as government officials and timber industry organizations in Ghana. 
The paper documents that timber rights allocation is associated with both bureaucratic and political corruption. The latter comes in two forms. 
First, the findings suggest that well-established relationships exist between politicians and senior bureaucrats on the one side and large-scale 
timber firms on the other involving exchange of timber rights for political support and/or material, personal benefits. Second, timber rights 
are allocated to persons or firms outside the timber sector allegedly as payment for political support. The paper concludes that the Voluntary 
Partnership Agreement between Ghana and the EU is likely to reduce the observed practises in the future through increased transparency. 
Keywords: Bureaucratic corruption, political corruption, lobbying, competitive bidding, Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
(FLEGT) 
Recherche de location de terre et allocation de droits au bois au Ghana
K. CARLSEN et C.P. HANSEN
Cet article décrit les types, les processus et l’importance de la recherche de location de terre dans l’allocation de droits au bois au Ghana. Il se 
base sur une analyse de 30 interviews avec des firmes de bois de grande à petite échelle, ainsi qu’avec des personnages officiels du gouverne-
ment et avec des organisations industrielles au Ghana. Cet article montre que l’allocation de droits au bois est associée à une corruption tout à 
la fois bureaucratique et politique. La corruption politique s’effectue de deux façons. Les découvertes montrent tout d’abord, que des relations 
bien établies existent entre les politiciens et les bureaucrates supérieurs d’un côté et les firmes de bois à grande échelle d’un autre côté, incluant 
des échanges de droits au bois avec un support politique ou des bénéfices personnels matériels. Elles montrent ensuite que les droits au bois 
sont accordés à des personnes ou des firmes extérieures au secteur du bois, il semblerait en tant que paiement pour un support politique. L’article 
conclut que l’Accord de partenariat volontaire entre le Ghana et l’Union Européènne va probablement réduire les pratiques observées dans le 
futur grâce à une transparence accrue.
La captación de rentas y la asignación de derechos madereros en Ghana
K. CARLSEN y C.P. HANSEN
Este artículo describe los tipos, procesos e importancia de la captación de rentas en la asignación de derechos madereros en Ghana, a partir de 
un análisis de 30 entrevistas a empresas de grande, mediana y pequeña escala, así como a funcionarios del gobierno y organizaciones de 
la industria de la madera de Ghana. El artículo documenta cómo la asignación de derechos sobre la madera está ligada a la corrupción 
burocrática y política. Esta última se presenta en dos formas. En primer lugar, los resultados sugieren la existencia de relaciones bien estableci-
das entre los políticos y burócratas de alto nivel, por un lado, y las empresas madereras a gran escala, por el otro, en cuanto a la concesión 
de derechos maderables a cambio de apoyo político o favores materiales o personales. En segundo lugar, se asignan derechos maderables a 
personas o empresas que no forman parte del sector de la madera, supuestamente como pago por el apoyo político. El artículo concluye que es 
probable que el Acuerdo Voluntario de Asociación entre Ghana y la UE reduzca en el futuro este comportamiento observado gracias a una 
mayor transparencia.
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INTRODUCTION
Rent-seeking – in the form of bureaucratic and political cor-
ruption, and lobbying – has been put forward as a prominent 
explanation for the apparent failure of resource rich states to 
transform such wealth into societal development and su stained 
economic growth (Broad 1995, Collier 2008, Kolstad and 
Søreide 2009, Ross 2001). It is argued that rent-seeking brings 
about policies that favour the interests of powerful actors 
rather than those of the general public and that it distracts the 
implementation of policy and dilutes legal and regulatory 
enforcement (Jain 2001, Khan and Sundaram 2000, Lambs-
dorff 2008, Scott 1972). There is a host of studies addressing 
rent-seeking through modelling or try to correlate policy out-
comes with corruption perception indexes, see review in e.g. 
Lambsdorff (2008), but there are fewer studies that address 
rent-seeking empirically. In response, this paper attempts an 
empirically based description and analysis of rent-seeking 
practises in connection with allocation of timber rights in 
Ghana. The specific purpose is to describe types, processes 
and importance of rent-seeking in the allocation of timber 
rights in Ghana. The paper is based on an analysis of 30 
interviews with large-, medium- and small-scale timber 
firms, as well as government officials and timber industry 
organizations in Ghana. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly 
reviews the different types of rent-seeking described in the 
literature with particular focus on sources that discuss 
rent-seeking in natural resource sectors and in developing 
countries. It is followed by a brief background section 
summarizing the legal framework and history of timber right 
allocation in Ghana. Next, sampling strategy and methods 
for data collection and analysis are described followed by 
presentation of the result. A discussion section and a brief 
concluding section complete the paper. 
RENT-SEEKING 
A rent is typically defined as an income “higher than the mini-
mum which an individual or firm would have accepted given 
alternative opportunities” (Khan and Sundaram 2000: 5). A 
rent is thus a surplus in the economy which various actors 
may seek to acquire through different types of rent-seeking 
activities. These activities are typically regarded as costly 
for society as resources put into rent-seeking could have 
alternative, more productive uses (Kolstad and Søreide 2009, 
Schleifer and Vishny 1993). Rent-seeking is thus often 
defined as the “socially costly pursuit of rents” (Svensson 
2005: 21), i.e. a cost. This paper applies an alternative 
definition of rent-seeking as “activities which seek to create, 
maintain or change the rights and institutions on which 
particular rents are based” (Khan and Sundaram 2000: 5). 
This definition is concerned with the processes between 
social actors rather than the cost. For purpose of structure, 
these processes are here grouped into bureaucratic corruption, 
political corruption and lobbying. 
Bureaucratic corruption
Corruption is commonly defined as “the misuse of public 
power for private benefit” (Lambsdorff 2008: 16). Bureau-
cratic (or petty) corruption involves a bureaucrat (the agent/
bribee) entrusted with power to implement a set of rules and 
a client (the briber) (Fjeldstad and Isaksen 2008, Lambsdorff 
2008). From an economist’s point of view the incentive for 
the bureaucrat to engage in corruption is personal gain and 
the bureaucrat may engage in corrupt activities as long as the 
perceived costs of being detected and punished are lower than 
the perceived benefits (Schleifer and Vishny 1993). Other 
scholars of corruption emphasize that the bureaucrat is 
embedded in a social network and daily life practises with 
obligations, traditions and norms which shape behaviour of 
both the bureaucrat and the briber, i.e. not only perceived 
costs and benefits shape behavior (Blundo et al. 2006). 
Corruption may be collusive or non-collusive. In the latter 
case, the bureaucrat demands a payment in excess of what 
is otherwise required, for example, when the bureaucrat 
demands a bribe for a service which the client is entitled to for 
free. Non-collusive corruption does not change rule compli-
ance, but increases the costs of the client. The client thus has 
an incentive to report the bribee and to support efforts that 
may change the practice. In collusive corruption, the inter-
action is mutually beneficial to the bribee and briber, e.g. by 
providing the agent/briber with services or permits that he/she 
would otherwise not be entitled to. The costs of the client are 
reduced (or benefits increased) while the bribee benefits 
through the bribe. Here, the parties are less likely to be 
support a change of practice (Bardhan 1997, Kolstad and Wiig 
2009, Smith et al. 2003).
Bureaucratic corruption (when collusive) leads to viola-
tion of rules and thus hinders implementation of policies 
aiming at changing behaviour of targeted actors (Kolstad and 
Søreide 2009, Lambsdorff 2008, Svensson 2005). Bureau-
cratic corruption may also encourage bureaucrats to engage in 
the creation of additional or more complex administrative 
procedures that provide them with additional discretionary 
powers which give opportunities for bribes (Khan and 
Sundaram 2000, Lambsdorff 2008). 
Political corruption 
Political corruption involves politicians, ministers and senior 
bureaucrats as the agent (bribee) on the one side and a client 
(briber) on the other (Lambsdorff 2008, Ross 2001, Scott 
1969). It can be described as the “abuse of office by those who 
make the game, e.g. decide on laws and regulations, and the 
allocation of resources in a society” (Fjeldstad and Isaksen 
2008: 6). It is thus considered as political corruption when 
politicians and ministers shape laws and regulations to the 
advantage of selected private sector actors or grant public 
contracts to specific firms in return for bribes or other types 
of favours. It follows that political corruption is less straight-
forward than bureaucratic corruption and involves a norma-
tive element because the activity may not be against the legal 
framework (de facto illegal), but rather the “public interest” 
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(Lambsdorff 2008).The literature on political corruption thus 
concerns the broader question of the nature of the state and 
the motives of politicians and high ranking civil servants. 
Some scholars see political corruption as an integrated part of 
ruling elites’ pursuit of personal gains and political power 
through extensive and long-established patron-client relations 
(Bates 1981, Bayart 2009). In relation to natural resources, 
Ross (2001) emphasizes those processes that give politicians 
or senior bureaucrats direct, exclusive and discretionary 
control over resource allocation processes, the fiscal regime 
(royalties, export fees etc.) and market access. He terms this 
process rent seizing. Such control allows the establishment 
of long-term relationships between politicians and senior 
bureaucrats on the one side and their clients on the other 
where the provision of rent opportunities e.g. in the form of 
resource rights are provided in exchange of personal/political 
favours, in cash or kind (Ross 2001). Such relations make 
market entry of new actors more difficult than under more 
competitive conditions and they discourage new and more 
efficient investments in the affected resource sectors. The 
reciprocal nature of the relationship is likely to motivate both 
sides to fiercely resist reform efforts with the potential to dis-
rupt the status quo (Khan and Sundaram 2000, Lambsdorff 
2008, Ross 2001). 
On the relationship between bureaucratic and political 
corruption, Lambsdorff (2008) argues that political corrup-
tion is likely to restrict the occurrence of bureaucratic corrup-
tion, because the latter reduces rents available at the political 
level. Other scholars, however, suggest that political corrup-
tion with no bureaucratic corruption is rare, because the 
contagious nature of political corruption makes lower level 
bureaucrats to adapt the “predatory” example of their princi-
pals (Fjeldstad and Isaksen 2008). Allowing lower level 
bureaucrats to take bribes and perhaps even enacting ambigu-
ous regulation which enhances the opportunities for bribes, 
may even be seen as a way for high-level State officials to 
ensure loyalty of lower level employees. This may be impor-
tant, e.g. when policies linked to political corruption require 
close participation of the bureaucratic level (Lipsky 2010, 
Scott 1972, Winther and Nielsen 2010).
Lobbying
The lobbying perspective asserts that actors cannot always 
achieve their self-interest individually, and hence engage in 
group action (Grindle 1989, Hackett 2001). Lobbying (some-
times also termed regulatory capture) may be defined as 
“processes through which special interests affect state inter-
vention in any of its forms” (Bó 2006: 203). It may determine 
the concerns that reach the policy agenda and how the policies 
addressing these concerns will be formulated (Bó 2006). 
Lobbying asserts that interest groups attempt to influence 
politicians and bureaucrats through means such as informa-
tion dissemination and public campaigns. It may also involve 
various forms of incentives for the politicians such as 
campaign contributions or the promise of future, lucrative 
employment (the revolving door phenomenon) (Agrell and 
Gautier 2012, Bó 2006, Hackett 2001). Lobbying may also 
involve negative incentives such as threats of spreading 
rumours and, in extreme cases, physical violence (Bó 2006). 
It is normally distinguished from political and bureaucratic 
corruption in that it does not involve bribes. It is, however, 
difficult to draw a clear distinction between lobbying and 
corruption. 
Lobbying is by some scholars regarded as a process of 
more or less full competition between interest groups, where 
the policy decision maker is responding more or less passive-
ly to the pressure of the strongest group (Stigler 1971). Others 
regard lobbying as a process where policy decision makers 
are actively pursuing private aims, e.g. to stay in office or 
future job opportunities (Boehm 2007), i.e. some form of 
intersect between political corruption and lobbying. Here, 
the relationship between decision makers and interest groups 
becomes more collusive and the resistance to change current 
practices is likely to be more prominent. 
It is argued that under conditions of weak institutions 
(lacking rule of law), it makes little sense for organized inte-
rests to attempt to influence the policy formulation process 
because decision-making activities tend to be disaggregated, 
personalized and particularistic and targeted at the stages of 
implementation rather than at the stages of agenda setting and 
policy formulation (Scott 1972, Grindle 1989). “Even though 
interest groups exist, businessmen in developing countries 
may realize that the administration of even the most favour-
able tax laws will have little or no resemblance of what is 
called for in the statutes. That is, they may have to bribe as 
much to secure enforcement of a favourable law as to escape 
the provisions of an unfavourable one. Under these circum-
stances, then, it may make more sense for each enterprise to 
quietly “buy” precisely what it needs in term of enforcement 
or non-enforcement, rather than to finance an open campaign 
for a new law that would be as formalistic as the existing one” 
(Scott 1972: 24–5). Accordingly, extensive organized interest 
group activity tends to be less clearly defined and observable 
in areas with weak or absent government institutions (Grindle 
1989).
TIMBER RIGHTS ALLOCATION IN GHANA
The timber resources1 are located in the Southern part of 
Ghana, the High Forest Zone. The zone covers approximately 
8 million ha of which 1.8 million ha are gazetted as forest 
reserve, i.e. a permanent forest estate. Outside the reserves 
there are few remaining forest patches, but many scattered 
trees in an agricultural landscape dominated by perennial 
crops, mainly cocoa. The forests and trees are owned 
communally by the local communities (the Stools), which are 
1
 The large majority of timber in Ghana originates from natural forests and “natural” trees nurtured by farmers on their farms. Plantation fore-
stry in still in its infancy, and the annual rate of plantation establishment is low, probably around 15,000 ha annually (Oduro et al. 2014). 
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headed by chiefs (Aryeetey et al. 2007, Boni 2005, Kasanga 
and Kotey 2001). Traditionally, the chiefs could negotiate 
agreements with individuals or firms on timber rights in 
return for payments, cash or material, to the Stool (Amanor 
1996). Following Ghana’s independence in 1957, the new 
government enacted the Concessions Act vesting all timber 
resources in the President in trust for the Stools (GoG 1962). 
This implies that the central government is in charge of (i) the 
allocation of timber rights to private firms; (ii) the formula-
tion and enforcement of the rules governing timber extrac-
tion; and (iii) the collection of fees from the timber firms 
(Hansen and Lund 2011). The accruing revenues are distri-
buted between the Stools, Traditional Councils, District 
Assemblies (local government) and the Forestry Commission 
of Ghana (FC) according to a sharing arrangement stipulated 
in the Constitution of Ghana (GoG 1992).
In 1994, Ghana adopted a Forest and Wildlife Policy. The 
policy, among other things, called for competitive bidding in 
allocation of timber rights. This was done in order to “elimi-
nate unnecessary speculations” and have fees to “. . .reflect 
the economic value of the resource and to recover optimum 
revenues for supporting the cost of sustainable resource 
management and development” (GoG 1994: 5.3.6 and 5.4.3). 
A number of legislative changes on timber rights allocation 
followed in the years after the adoption of the policy 
(Table 1). 
The 1997 Timber Resources Management Act (TRMA) 
and the 1998 Timber Resources Management Regulations 
(TRMR) did not introduce competitive bidding (as the policy 
had stipulated) but instead revised the types of timber rights 
that could be allocated and the administrative procedures. 
Timber Utilization Contracts (TUCs) were introduced as the 
only valid type of timber right for commercial purposes. All 
previous concessions and leases were to be converted to TUCs 
within 6 months. Detailed application procedures and award 
criteria were put in place under a newly established Timber 
Rights Evaluation Committee (TREC). Based on the recom-
mendation of TREC, and upon approval by the Parliament, 
the Minister of Land and Natural Resources was to award 
TUCs on behalf of the President (GoG1997). TUCs were of 
40 years duration. Further, the Chief Conservator of Forest 
(now Chief Executive of the Forestry Commission) was 
granted authority to issue 5 years Timber Utilization Permits 
(TUPs) to District Assemblies, Town Committees, rural 
community groups and NGOs after application. TUPs were to 
be issued exclusively for the harvest of a specified number of 
timber trees for social and community purposes. Another type 
of permits, Salvage Felling Permits (SFPs), was meant for 
salvage of trees on land undergoing development like road 
construction, expansion of human settlements or farms (GoG 
1998). 
After pressure from the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, who conditioned recapitalization of old debts 
to the enactment of competitive bidding for timber rights, the 
2002 Timber Resources Management (Amendment) Act 
and the 2003 Timber Resource Management (Amendment) 
Regulations paved the way for introduction of competitive 
bidding for natural timber resources. TREC was to publicly 
advertise invitations for pre-qualified applicants to bid for 
timber rights to specific areas. The timber right is awarded 
to the firm willing to pay the highest annual fee, called the 
Timber Rights Fee. In addition there are requirements for a 
Social Responsibility Agreement with local communities and 
a forest management plan (GoG 2003:13(2)).
The de facto implementation of the timber rights alloca-
tion framework has differed significantly from the de jure 
regulation. 62 areas have been ratified as TUCs but only 7 of 
them have been allocated after competitive bidding (Global 
Witness 2013). In addition, large numbers of TUPs have 
been allocated to timber firms, not to local communities 
as stipulated in the legislation. No complete information is 
available, but for 2001 and 2002 alone, 572 TUPs and SFPs 
TABLE 1 Overview of timber right allocation policies in Ghana and their implementation since 1992
Period 1992–1996 1996–2000 2000–2004 2004–2008 2008–2012
Key policy and 
legislative 
developments
•  Ghana Forest 
& Wildlife 
Policy (1994)
•  1997 Timber 
Resources 
Management 
Act 
•  1998 Timber 
Resources 
Management 
Regulations
•  2002 Timber Resources 
Management (Amend-
ment) Act
•  2003 Timber Resources 
Management (Amend-
ment) Regulations
•  Voluntary 
Partnership 
Agreement 
(VPA) between 
Ghana and EU
De facto imple-
mentation in 
forest reserves
Administrative 
allocation of 
leases
Administrative 
allocation of 
leases
Primarily administrative 
allocation of TUCs 
Primarily adminis-
trative allocation of 
TUCs and SFPs
Administrative 
allocation of TUCs 
and SFPs
De facto imple-
mentation outside 
forest reserves
Administrative 
allocation of 
leases and permits
Administrative 
allocation of 
permits
Administrative allocation 
of TUPs and SFPs
Administrative 
allocation of TUPs 
and SFPs
Administrative 
allocation of SFPs
Government* NDC NDC NPP NPP NDC
*NDC: National Democratic Council; NPP: New Patriotic Party.
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were allocated covering an area of 1.4 million ha (Danso and 
Opoku 2004). Also, the average size of the SFPs allocated in 
2001 and 2002 – 22.9 square km – suggests that far from all 
permits under this heading can be categorized as ”salvage” in 
accordance with the law. Moreover, anecdotal information 
collected as part of the present study suggests widespread 
allocations of TUPs in 2007. The number and extent of 
permits allocated under this procedure is again not known. 
With the change of government in 2008 and the Voluntary 
Partnership Agreement (VPA) between Ghana and EU under 
the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
(FLEGT) action plan – more on this to follow – TUPs are 
no longer issued. Contemporary timber rights in Ghana thus 
consist of TUCs, SFPs and “old” leases and concessions not 
yet converted to TUCs. 
METHODS
Data collection involved 30 semi-structured interviews 
carried out in September 2011. 24 interviews were conducted 
with respondents from 22 timber firms, most of them located 
in the Ashanti region. The remaining 6 interviews were 
held with representatives from the FC, the Ministry of Lands, 
Forestry and Mines, Ghana Timber Millers’ Organization 
(GTMO), and Ghana Timber Association (GTA). 
Because no public records are available on timber right 
holders in Ghana, the selection of timber firms for interviews 
took place according to the principle of snowball sampling 
(Fink and Kosecoff 1998). Two snowballs were followed. 
One took point of departure in a list of timber rights holders 
in the Ashanti region obtained from the Regional Office of the 
FC. The second used contacts to large-scale and medium-
scale timber firms established through earlier research. 
During interviews, information and contact details for addi-
tional timber rights holders/firms were procured and this 
helped identify the subsequent respondents.
Based on knowledge of the sector from previous research, 
a typology of timber right holders in Ghana had been 
developed beforehand with the aim of having all categories 
represented in the sample: (i) large firms with long-term, 
on-reserve timber rights and own processing facilities; (ii) 
medium scale firms, primarily with short-term (off reserve) 
timber rights and own processing facilities; (iii) medium scale 
firms without timber rights and own resource rights; (iv) small 
scale firms, primarily with short-term, off-reserve timber 
rights and no or small-scale processing facilities; (iv) small-
scale firms with processing and/or logging facilities but no 
timber rights; (v) individuals/firms that are not engaged in 
timber production as such but hold timber right(s). Interviews 
with respondents from categories (i)–(iv) were carried out 
(Table 2). It proved difficult to schedule interviews with 
category (v) respondents. This was partly due to reluctance 
among category (i)–(iv) respondents to share contact details 
of category (v) respondents and partly due to reluctance of 
category (v) firms/individuals to participate in interviews. 
This reluctance was primarily explained with reference to the 
sensitivity of the timber rights issue. 
The interviews focused on how the firms had acquired 
their present timber rights and – where relevant – on narra-
tives of unsuccessful attempts to acquire timber rights. Issues 
of relevance to rent-seeking, such as de facto allocation 
procedures, level of discretion in bureaucratic allocation, the 
role and relations between firm and government staff and 
politicians were systematically probed into during interviews. 
The respondent was typically the Managing Director or 
General Manager of the firm. Finally, interviews with timber 
industry organizations and government officials focused on 
the position, efforts and activities of the organization in 
relation to timber rights allocation. 
All respondents were informed about the purpose of the 
research prior to the interview and asked for their consent. 
Respondents were assured anonymity. A digital voice 
recor der was used during interviews. In instances where the 
respondent preferred the interview not to be recorded, 
detailed notes were taken instead. All recorded interviews 
were subsequentl y transcribed. Interview transcripts were 
coded to typologies (bureaucratic corruption, political 
corruption, lobbying) and actors (small-scale, medium-scale, 
large-scale firms). 
Reflections on methods and validity 
The topic of the research is sensitive which calls for a reflec-
tion on the validity of study findings. During interviews, 
respondents often talked “around the issues”, using vague 
and imprecise phrases. Often activities were narrated as what 
others were doing and made reference to general issues in the 
timber sector rather than being presented as own experiences 
and own behaviour and strategies in relation to timber rights 
acquisition. During interviews, efforts were made, through 
probing, to get direct and specific narratives related to the 
particular person/firm in question, rather than general state-
ments. The study was fairly successful in achieving this. 
Part of this probing involved cross-referencing observations 
and confronting interviewees with the narratives of other 
respondents. The findings presented below suggesting 
TABLE 2 Overview of interviewed firms 
Category of firm No. of interviewed firms No. of firms with timber rights No. of firms with processing facilities
Large-scale  3  3  3
Medium-scale  8  4  8
Small-scale 11 11  2
Total 22 18 13
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distinct patterns and various forms of rent-seeking are 
considered valid and credible primarily with reference to the 
consistency in the narratives.
As mentioned, no interviews have been conducted with 
category (v) respondents. For this group, we rely on the 
narratives from the timber firms who subsequently negotiate 
agreements with them. It would obviously have strengthened 
the findings to have category (v) respondents, but for the 
reasons explained above this was not possible. Moreover, the 
research would have benefitted from additional interviews 
with bureaucrats, at central and at district level, to gain addi-
tional insight in the exchange relations between agents within 
the State bureaucracy. Also, interviews with politicians such 
as ministers and members of parliament could have added 
information on these interactions. Based on the interviews 
that were conducted with bureaucrats it can, however, be 
questioned whether this would have provided further insights, 
because the narratives/insights gained were less rich than 
those obtained from the interactions with the timber firms.
RESULTS
Bureaucratic corruption
The narratives of small- and medium-scale firms point 
towards a number of practises that are here described under 
the heading bureaucratic corruption. The medium- and small-
scale firms explain that they are primarily applying for TUPs 
and SFPs. These are primarily short-term (up to 5 years) and 
in the off-reserves. According to the legal framework, it is 
the responsibility of the FC to identify suitable areas for 
allocation of timber rights, to inform and obtain consent from 
concerned landowners, and advertise the areas for competi-
tive bidding (GoG 1997, GoG 1998, GoG 2002 and GoG 
2003). The interviews, however, reveal how the firms are in 
practice given the responsibility for these tasks, including 
identification of potential permit areas and negotiations with 
chiefs and fringe communities “. . .we pay them [scouts] and 
send them out and they will go around and they will tell you 
that on his round he saw some land located here or there. . .” 
(Interview no. 3). Respondents also describe how these tasks 
typically require good relations to bureaucrats with responsi-
bilities in timber right. Such relations are hard to establish 
without unofficial payments. Small-scale and medium-scale 
firms describe how they use their contacts in FC to identify 
an area to apply for “. . .the way you identify it [the area] is 
usually in the way you get a hint from somebody in FC. . .” 
(Interview no. 10) and some get assistance from the district 
cartographer “. . .the cartographer knows all the places, where 
it is encumbered and where it is not encumbered. So if you 
approach him, he will tell you that this and this place is ok. . . 
it is important to know the cartographer. . .” (Interview no. 
20). Respondents explain how unofficial payments to bureau-
crats at various levels in the system is a widespread practice 
to motivate or smooth the process of getting an application 
through the system “. . .it is their work in the office. It is not 
the money that you give to them that influences whether you 
get it [the permit] or not. But that the person is doing these 
things for you at times you have to give him something. . .” 
(Interview no. 4). The payments made are often described as 
a natural part of interactions with bureaucracy “. . .As for tips 
it is natural, it is illegal, but it is natural. In any establishment 
you sometimes even have to put some money down from your 
pocket, but they cannot ask anything from you. But for you to 
motivate them – it is not a bribe – it is a motivation. If you 
come late in the afternoon you want him to help you because 
you need the letter, he can stay on and help you and you pay 
for his lunch or something like that. . .” (Interview no. 3).
The payments take place in the way that the applicant 
makes sure that a certain amount is handed over personally 
to the officer at the given level. This means that passing the 
application from one person at one level to the next person at 
the next level requires for the applicant to be present – perso-
nally or through a trusted agent – to make sure that the 
application is taken through and that the right person is 
“motivated”. Particularly the small-scale firms describe how 
this can be a time and resource demanding exercise – often 
with an uncertain outcome “. . .maybe you can go early in the 
morning and you will not get it and then somebody comes 
in the evening time and he will get it straight. . .” (Interview 
no. 13). In terms of determining the appropriate amount to 
be paid for a particular service, especially the small- and 
medium-scale firms describe how this is an unpredictable 
endeavour “. . .the money that you have to pay to motivate a 
certain officer to work for you is not a fixed amount, and the 
officer will never ask for the money. You will just know that 
this is needed, and you top up the amount paid until they will 
let you know – indirectly – that it is enough or until you are 
not able to pay more and everything you have paid so far will 
be lost. . .” (Interview no. 15). 
Acquiring timber rights in this way is, however, not only 
a matter of making sufficiently high unofficial payments at 
different stages of the process; it is also intimately related to 
social relations and ties. Many respondents stress how good 
relations to bureaucrats are essential “. . .they are people that 
you are going to work with every day so you better have a 
good relation they are your major stakeholders. They are in 
power. . .” (Interview no. 2). Such relations can be based on a 
history of acquaintance or working relations established over 
longer periods of time “. . .because we have been around for 
a long time we can get things done quicker than someone who 
has not been around for that long. . .” (Interview no. 2). In 
many instances personal links to central level bureaucrats 
may facilitate the acquirement of the timber right and the 
administrative application process. As narrated by one 
respondent: “. . .I will tell you how [to acquire a resource 
right]: you have a friend in FC they will help you to find a 
place. You will make your company and you apply for it and 
they will give it to you. . .” (Interview no. 27). 
The medium-scale firms without timber rights describe 
how they have been discouraged from pursuing timber rights 
because of the hassle, costs and uncertain outcome of the 
process. They are instead relying on buying logs from small-
scale firms that have managed to access timber rights but 
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have no processing facilities: “. . .As it is uncertain whether 
the unofficial payments for getting a concession will actually 
give us what we want, and as we learned that we will not get 
it unless we pay a lot we have decided to continue to work 
with contractors. . .” (Interview no. 12). Other firms have 
decided to leave the timber sector altogether with reference to 
the unpredictability and need for informal payments. 
Political corruption 
For acquiring on-reserve timber rights – in the past leases, 
now TUCs – large-scale firms describe that connections to 
politicians and high level bureaucrats are important. The 
small-scale and medium-scale firms on the other hand 
describe that they do not have the resources to establish these 
links and hence do generally not have access to these timber 
rights. Respondents from the large-scale firms describe how 
connections need to be established and “groomed” over time. 
Contributions to election campaigns, financial assistance 
to overseas education for family members of politicians and 
provision of luxury vehicles are among the elements that 
respondents describe as important for maintaining their links 
with politicians and high level bureaucrats. Respondents also 
explain that these means are not used in a one-to-one 
exchange for a particular timber right. They are rather inte-
grated elements of long-standing relationships. They are used 
to maintain and strengthen the relationship and may some-
time in the future materialize in a timber right allocation. 
Additional means for maintaining relations include activities 
of a more social nature, e.g. in the form of hosting lunches, 
dinner parties or field visits with press coverage for politi-
cians when they are visiting the area where the firm resides. 
The large-scale firms (the directors/owners) have direct 
relations with key politicians and top bureaucrats, but also 
make use of representatives/agents. These are persons who 
are close to the political decision-making and familiar with 
the “rules of the game” and can represent the firm and engage 
in day-to-day interactions with politicians and senior bureau-
crats in Accra. The representatives are typically former senior 
bureaucrats or other persons with knowledge of the political 
decision-making and with a political network. 
Apart from relationships between politicians and senior 
bureaucrats and large-scale firms, respondents also describe 
processes whereby resource rights are allocated to individuals 
with no apparent linkages to timber production or forestry, i.e. 
individuals and firms with no previous timber rights, experi-
ences or equipment, presumably by virtue of being political 
and/or personal supporters. “. . . There are two categories: the 
businesses that have their connections and get steady access 
to these types of concessions. They are more or less fixed. The 
individuals who get little permits, they are always changing 
depending on who is in the position of power and their 
[political] linkages. . .” (Interview no. 10). Or as narrated by 
another respondent: “. . .if you are a member of the party and 
you give financial support to the campaign or if you make 
sure that this man will stay in office and then in return you will 
get a concession. That is the political way. . .” (Interview no. 
17). In the past, this practice presumably involved off-reserve 
TUPs and SFPs. However, as the resource base is dwindling 
and off-reserve areas degraded, a new practice has emerged 
whereby single compartments (approximately 128 ha) in 
forest reserves have been allocated as rewards for political 
support: Respondents describe how this practice has negative 
influence on the forest management and hence on the state 
of the forest: “. . .we see in a lot of areas that they are not 
applying proper forest management because they give out 
compartments within a felling [coup] to about 10 different 
companies. This means that the area will be totally degraded 
because who is going to put the necessary inputs?” (Interview 
no. 26).
Timber rights in the hands of a person without skills and 
equipment only gain value for the holder when sold or sub-
contracted to a timber firm: “. . .they will get the concession as 
a repayment for some political favour and then they sell the 
logs to the contractors. . .” (Interview no. 24). In some cases, 
the timber right holder will contact a small-scale firm 
(logging firm) who will provide felling equipment and carry 
the operational expenses. In other instances the timber right 
holder will contact the large scale firms directly and make 
agreements for log extraction and further processing “. . .
There are other people who have their concessions or com-
partments. . .many of them aren’t really involved in the timber 
industry at all, they just got a hold of them through favours to 
some people in power. . . we make an agreement with them we 
pay them per m3. . .” (Interview no. 10). The large-scale firms 
even describe how the deals on who is going to buy the logs 
from the politically allocated compartments are sometimes 
made during the allocation. “. . .they know how desperate we 
are. . . so they distribute the permits to their friends because 
they know that we will pay. . .” (Interview no. 6). In other 
cases, the timber firms use their connections to FC to acquire 
information on where allocations have recently been made to 
individuals not engaged in timber production “. . .usually they 
[timber right holders] will call if they know us. Otherwise we 
are quite close to a lot of the forestry people like [bureaucrat] 
and they will let us know that this or that compartment has 
been allocated so and so, we know the people there are 
not going to work in it, so maybe it would be a good idea to 
contact them and see if you can come to an agreement. . .” 
(Interview no. 10). These deals require payments and transac-
tion costs “. . .you have to buy from him before you can feed 
your mill. . . because of the political system. . . this middle 
person has to be here. So that he gets the money. . .” 
(Interview no. 24). “. . .for example me [] 70% of my logs are 
coming from agreements with contractors that have their 
TUCs. . . most of them have been allocated in political 
ways. . .” (Interview no. 27). 
Lobbying
The large-scale firms describe how they are able to organize 
to discuss their concerns and getting their message through 
to bureaucrats and political decision makers. As example, 
the respondents mention that through collective action and 
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persistent resistance coordinated by the GTMO the timber 
industry has been successful in halting plans to raise stump-
age fees by more than 200 per cent2 “. . .because of our 
engagement, the government accepted not to raise the stump-
age so the industry can also have some advantage and they 
will be able to export at world market prices. . .” (Interview 
no. 19). Respondents also narrate how they have been suc-
cessful in lobbying for a reduction of the export levies with 
reference to their adverse effects on the profitability and 
further development of the timber industry, including jobs, in 
Ghana. Consequently, the export levies have been reduced 
from 3% to 1.5% of the export value. On the question of 
timber rights allocation, including competitive bidding and 
transparency in allocation processes, there appears to be no 
collective industry stance and firms are primarily engaged in 
fighting for themselves: “. . .the issues on allocations we have 
more or less accepted, it is very difficult to control. You may 
reach some of the people in power now when they change, 
there comes another battle. . .” (Interview no. 10). Another 
respondent remarked: “. . . Most of the time everyone is fight-
ing for himself . . . I may go and fight for the organization but 
I will also go behind and fight for one concession for me. . .” 
(Interview no. 27).
As would be expected, the results suggest that collective 
action is more pronounced among the large-scale firms (they 
are few), whereas collective action among the small- and 
medium-scale firms (they are many) is less developed. 
DISCUSSION
Discussion of empirical findings
Figure 1 summarizes the findings of the study in a resource 
flow chart developed with inspiration from Khan and Sunda-
ram (2000). It shows the various actors (politicians, bureau-
crats, large-scale firms, medium-scale firms, small-scale firms 
and individuals) and the flows of resources (timber rights – 
rents) and payments (bribes) and services/support. 
The study suggests that bureaucratic corruption exists 
alongside political corruption. The apparent co-existence of 
bureaucratic and political corruption supports the argument of 
Fjeldstad and Isaksen (2008) that political corruption with no 
bureaucratic corruption is rare. The study did not engage in a 
detailed investigation to further illuminate or understand the 
linkages between the bureaucratic and political corruption, 
but it is identified as a topic for further research.
Much of what has been described under the heading 
bureaucratic corruption are forms of everyday practices 
between bureaucrats and firms, embedded in cultural prac-
tices and norms (tradition, friendship, professional ties etc.), 
and by many of the respondents not even considered as 
corruption. Payments or other services are an inherent part 
of the interactions between government officials and private 
actors and as argued by e.g. Scott (1972) and Khan and Sun-
daram (2000) the distinction between gifts of appreciation 
2
 The stumpage fees have been held at constant nominal values since 2003. After the conclusion of the research, the stumpage fee rates have 
been increased (March 2014).
FIGURE 1 Resource flows in the timber sector in Ghana
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and bribes can be hard to make. What is of particular interest 
here, though, is the fact that administrative practices appear 
to have been adopted from the de jure legislation in ways 
that create room for bureaucratic discretion and demands 
or expectations for informal payments. These practices are 
primarily described by the small-scale and medium-scale 
firms in their pursuit of TUPs and SFPs, and primarily in the 
off-reserves. To what extent these practices and allocations 
also involve payments to senior bureaucrats and/or politi-
cians, i.e. political corruption, is not clear from the study. The 
respondents clearly focused on the interactions with lower 
level bureaucrats, but this could be a result of the sensitive 
nature of the matter.
The study also documents political corruption, i.e. the 
allocation of timber rights in exchange of personal favors 
and/or political support. Two different models emerge from 
the study. The study documents that the large-scale, well-
established timber firms nurture relations with politicians and 
high-level bureaucrats around timber rights. But there are also 
firms and individuals without any track record in the forest 
sector who are granted timber rights, presumable as reward 
for political support. These timber rights are subsequently 
re-sold or sub-contracted to “real” timber firms. The political 
corruption is primarily related to allocation of timber rights in 
the forest reserves which are longer term and generally more 
profitable than the off-reserve resources. It is therefore likely 
that larger rent flows are tied to political corruption as 
compared to bureaucratic corruption. 
The exchange relations between politicians and their cli-
ents, whether they are (large-scale) timber firms or individual, 
political supporters, are collusive, which suggest that none of 
these groups are inclined to support institutional changes in 
timber right allocation. Following the arguments of Khan and 
Sundaram (2000), the 1997 TRMA, the 1998 TRMR and their 
amendments in 2002 and 2003 have had limited success (poor 
implementation), precisely because the most powerful and 
influential actors have resisted rather than supported their 
implementation because these institutional changes go against 
their interests. Study findings document that in spite of 
attempts to change this institutional practice, timber right 
allocations continue to take place in a centralized and discre-
tionary manner.
The findings of the study provide an example of “rent 
seizing” (Ross 2001). In the Ghana case, all the way since 
the 1962 Concessions Act (GoG 1962) politicians and senior 
bureaucrats have had the direct, exclusive and discretionary 
control over timber right allocations and the price to be paid 
for standing timber by the timber right holder. It is noted that 
it is exactly the low official fees that create the high resource 
rents and thus make timber rights an object for patronage and 
rent-seeking activities (Hansen and Lund 2011).
Finally, the study suggests that timber rights allocation 
is not a suitable issue for organization of collective action 
because the firms have strong individual interests in having as 
large a share of the cake as possible, not least in a situation 
with a dwindling resource base. However, as described, the 
rents in the system are contingent on the maintenance of low, 
official fees on timber, and here the firms have a common 
interest, and consequently have been able to organize 
collective action, and quite successfully. 
Consequences of observed rent-seeking practices 
The empirical focus of this study has been on the rent-seeking 
processes shaping current timber right allocation and less on 
the consequences (outcome) of these. Still, the findings of the 
study point towards consequences for involved firms in the 
form of reduced levels of investments and efficiency and for 
society in the form of reduced benefit sharing and resource 
degradation. The findings suggest that it is profitable, or 
indeed necessary, for the firms to employ resources on rent-
seeking rather than on investments in productive firm capital. 
Alongside substantial transaction costs associated with 
doing business, this allegedly leads to reduced profit margins, 
limits the incentive to undertake new efficiency enhancing 
investments and drives investments away from the sector 
(Lambsdorff 2008, Palmer 2005, Svensson 2005). 
In terms of benefit distribution, the current practise of 
timber right allocation, including keeping fees at a low level, 
cause rents to be skewed towards political actors, their 
supporters, and, probably to a lesser degree, the bureaucrats 
involved in the allocation processes. This happens at the 
expense of the constitutional beneficiaries of timber revenues, 
i.e. District Assemblies, Traditional Councils, Stools and 
the FC. This again has negative implications for the financial 
resources available for management and governance of the 
forest. Also the allocation of short-term timber rights to single 
compartments in forest reserves contributes to forest degrada-
tion because it compromises sustainable forest management 
practices. Finally, the current practices raise doubts about the 
commitment given by the state to sustainable forest manage-
ment. The timber right allocation process is important in this 
regard as it can be seen as the first step in a chain of proce-
dures for responsible resource management. If signals are 
sent that this first step can be evaded, it sends strong signals 
as to how to go about the subsequent steps.
The way forward: measures to address rent-seeking
In 2008, Ghana signed a Voluntary Partnership Agreement 
(VPA) on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
(FLEGT) with the European Commission. The aim is to curb 
illegal logging and strengthening forest governance through a 
Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS) and associated 
institutional reforms. The TLAS is not yet fully operational, 
and reforms not implemented, but developments associated 
with the VPA implementation have already had a positive 
effect on curbing the rent-seeking practises related to timber 
rights allocations. First, as described, the VPA has resulted in 
a stop of allocation of TUPs. Second, the VPA has resulted, 
for the first time, in the release from the FC of a complete 
list of allocated timber rights (Global Witness 2013). The 
accuracy of the list is debated (FC 2013) but at least this is a 
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positive start. These observations echo other studies that have 
pointed at role of the VPA in facilitating increased level of 
transparency and broader participation (Beeko and Arts 2010, 
Owusu 2009, Bollen and Ozinga 2013). The potential of 
the VPA in bringing about permanent changes in the current 
practises and incentive structures, obviously rely on the full 
implementation of the TLAS and roll out of the envisaged 
reforms. An additional aspect that may add positively in 
addressing rent-seeking practises is the degraded nature of the 
timber resource. Partly as a result of past rent-seeking prac-
tises, the timber resources in Ghana are highly degraded 
(Hansen and Treue 2008, Hawthorne 2012) and the rents that 
can be extracted from the timber resource are dwindling 
which makes the resource less interesting for political corrup-
tion in the form of patron-client relations and reforms more 
likely.
Apart from the efforts under the VPA, the anti-corruption 
literature suggests a number of measures to curb bureaucratic 
and political corruption. Suggested measures to address 
bureaucratic corruption include: (i) increased penalties, (ii) 
increased official salaries, (iii) simplification of regulations 
and bureaucratic procedures, (iv) privatization, (v) merito-
cratic hiring and promotion, and (vi) staff rotation (Lambs-
dorff 2008, Fjeldstad and Isaksen 2008). These may also be 
considered in the forest sector of Ghana, but with reference to 
the present study, the cultural embeddedness and everyday 
nature of the corruption challenges practical implementation 
of these measures. On political corruption key measures are 
typically: (i) institutional reforms promoted by civil society, 
the private sector and the media, (ii) increased competition for 
political mandates and (iii) strengthening of the independence 
and quality of the judicial service (Lambsdorff 2008). They 
all focus on increased transparency and accountability of 
politicians and high-level bureaucrats (Kolstad and Wiig 
2009). The first measure links back to the VPA and its goal 
of institutional reforms. Similar objectives of broad-based 
institutional reforms are stated in Ghana’s Readiness Plan for 
REDD+ (FC 2010). The two latter measures are more general, 
long-term measures, not sector-specific, and hence need to be 
implemented as part of large, general governance reforms, 
and less likely to influence rent-seeking practices in the forest 
sector in the short-term. 
CONCLUSION 
The study has documented that timber rights allocation in 
Ghana involves both bureaucratic and political corruption. 
The former is primarily mentioned by small- and medium-
scale timber firms seeking timber rights outside the forest 
reserves and appears to relate – at least partly – to everyday 
practises of “doing business” rather than direct demands for 
bribes. The evidence for political corruption is provided by 
the large-scale firms who describe their long-standing rela-
tionships with politicians and senior bureaucrats involving 
exchange of timber rights for political support and/or person-
al material benefits, i.e. patron-client relationships. The study 
also documents a second type of political corruption whereby 
individuals or firms outside the timber sector are awarded 
timber rights presumably as a reward for political support. 
These timber rights are subsequently transferred to timber 
firms with the required expertise and equipment. The study 
thus documents bureaucratic corruption taking place along-
side political corruption, but it does not hold information to 
illuminate or understand the linkages between the two. This 
could be a topic for further research. 
Lobbying appears not to be of direct relevance in timber 
rights allocation or the de jure policies prescribing it, because 
the firms have large individual material interests in getting 
access to as many areas as possible. However, collective 
action is prominent in relation to the political/administrative 
setting of the level of the harvesting fees (the stumpage fee) 
where the firms have lobbied successfully for their freeze. 
The low level of fees is what in essence creates the rents and 
drives the documented rent-seeking activities. 
An array of measures can potentially be considered to 
curb corruption in relation to timber rights allocation. The 
Voluntary Partnership Agreement between Ghana and the EU 
under the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
action plan is believed to be an important step forward in 
curbing rent-seeking in the timber sector because it has 
increased, and is likely to increase further if fully implemente d, 
the transparency of timber rights allocation. In addition, the 
degraded nature of the timber resources is likely to contribute 
to reduce rent-seeking and facilitate the reform process. 
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